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THE UNWED FATHER'S PARENTAL RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
AFTER SP.B.: A RETREAT IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTION
INTRODUCTION
A child, S.P.B., was born during the summer of 1979. The father,
P.D.G., admitted paternity, but denied any obligation to support the child.
The father and the child's mother, C.F.B., were both college students at the
time of the birth. They never married and were not living together at the
time of trial. The father claimed that when the mother told him she was
pregnant, he indicated his desire that the pregnancy be terminated and of-
fered to pay for an abortion. The father asserted that this discussion took
place within the first trimester of pregnancy. The mother did not consent to
an abortion, gave birth to S.P.B., and subsequently filed a lawsuit against
the father for child support. The mother has had custody of the child since
birth. '
At trial the father argued that due process requires that he have an
opportunity to rebut the irrebuttable presumption of section 19-6-116 of the
Colorado Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),2 which states that a father should
share in the support of his child. The father also contended that he was
denied equal protection as a result of the state's use of a gender-based classi-
fication. The state, on behalf of the minor child S.P.B., argued in favor of
the El Paso County District Court's award of both child support and half the
birth expense.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the father's child support obli-
gation, finding the father's due process and equal protection arguments to be
without merit.3 In so deciding, the Colorado Supreme Court rejected the
father's argument that the nexus, or rational relationship, between sexual
intercourse and birth is broken. Instead the court relied on Roe v. Wade4 and
subsequent cases5 which hold that the father's desire that the fetus be
1. In re S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213, 1214 (Colo. 1982); Brief for Respondent-Appellant, In re
S.P.B., 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent-Appellant].
2. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
3. This case was transferred by the court of appeals to the Colorado Supreme Court
under COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-4-110(l)(a)(19 73 ) because of the constitutional question
involved.
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding state criminal abortion statutes unconstitutional). In Roe
the Court did not base its reasoning on the permissibility of the gender-based classification, but
rather on the woman's fundamental right to privacy. The Court held that the decision whether
to bear a child or have an abortion lies solely with the mother and her physician.
5. Seegenerally Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976). The Maher Court stated that the constitutional freedom recognized in Roe v.
Wade and its progeny did not prevent Connecticut from making a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion. Consequently, the Court upheld a welfare regulation under which
Medicaid recipients received payments for childbirth expenses but not for medical services re-
lated to abortions.
The Supreme Court in Danforth struck down a Missouri statute requiring prior written
consent of the spouse of a woman seeking an abortion during the first twelve weeks of pregnancy
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aborted or carried to term is irrelevant and neither state legislatures nor the
courts, on behalf of the father, may interfere with the mother's decision
whether to give birth.
Before Roe, simple reproductive biology and the illegality and unavaila-
bility of abortion were thought to produce the required nexus between sex-
ual intercourse and birth. 6 In the years since that decision, however, some
legal scholars have argued that the woman's essentially unilateral decision to
bear or to abort serves as an intervening factor and replaces the act of inter-
course as the proximate cause of birth.7 The SPB court gave no credence
to that argument, and reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's recog-
nition of the legally mandated equality between illegitimate and legitimate
children. 8 At the same time, however, it would appear that the court's hold-
ing may infringe on the constitutional protection afforded the father through
a serious procedural flaw that denies his due process of law.9
This comment traces the evolution of illegitimacy and child support,
the apparent conclusion of a trend by the Colorado Supreme Court to recog-
nize unwed fathers' rights, and the current status of gender-based classifica-
tions in Colorado. In addition, the comment discusses the rationale behind
the S.PB. court's decision and the potential social ramifications of this opin-
ion, which strikes a precarious balance between the competing interests of
the state and the individual.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Illegitimacy and Child Support
1. Development at Common Law
Illegitimacy, a social problem for the last two centuries, often has been
viewed as an index of the moral state of the community.' 0 At common law
the parents of an illegitimate child had no duty to support him, since he was
considered "filius nullius," a child of no one."I Various arguments have
been advanced in support of this proposition. It has been said that the un-
wed father could not be made to support his illegitimate child because of the
uncertainty of the child's paternity.' 2 It also has been argued that the policy
of discrimination between illegitimate and legitimate children encourages
unless the abortion was certified to be necessary to preserve the life of the mother. The Court
said that the state cannot " 'delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is absolutely
and totally prohibited from exercising during the first trimester of pregnancy.' " 428 U.S. at 69
(citation omitted).
6. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 3.
7. Swan, Abortion on Maternal Demand: Paternal Support Liability Implcattons, 9 VAL. U.L.
REV. 243 (1975).
8. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). The terms "illegitimate" and "legitimate"
should be avoided, because of the stigma associated with bastardy. See infra note 31 and accom-
panying text.
9. See inf/a note 123 and accompanying text.
10. P. LASLETr, BASTARDY AND ITS COMPARATIVE HISTORY 1 (1980).
11. H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 3 (1981).




marriage, and serves as a deterrent to illicit cohabitation. 13 Most twentieth
century commentators find this argument uncivilized because it seeks to
punish innocent children on the unreasonable hope that their suffering will
promote marriage. 14
By 1576, enforcement of the English Poor Law' 5 provided a quasi-crim-
inal procedure for obtaining support from the natural father of an illegiti-
mate child. The Poor Law was designed to relieve the state of the burden of
supporting such children, who were thought of as sin turned into flesh.'
6
Although many years ago the common law ceased legitimacy-based dis-
crimination in mother-child relationships, 17 as recently as 1953 the New
Jersey Supreme Court strained to find a paternal child support obligation in
the common law.' Failing in this attempt, the court found it necessary to
fashion this obligation from equitable principles, natural law and reference
to the laws of "civilized European countries.' 9
Recently, the trend has been to impose an equal support obligation on
mothers and fathers, either by statute or by judicial decisions. Courts some-
times base this obligation on state equal rights amendments or on the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.
20
2. United States Supreme Court Decisions
More than a dozen Supreme Court cases since 1968, decided on the
basis of the equal protection clause, have mandated full equality for the ille-
gitimate child. 2 ' As a result, many state statutes discriminating against ille-
gitimate children have been held unconstitutional.
22
Citing the fourteenth amendment, the Court has demanded equal legal
treatment of legitimate and illegitimate children over a broad range of sub-
stantive areas. 23 Even so, in 1976 the Court refused to declare illegitimacy
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. An Act for Setting the Poor on Work, 1576, 18 Eliz. 1, c.3 § 7, cited in H. KRAUSE,
CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 3 (1981).
16. FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 6 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds. 1979).
17. Dalton v. State, 6 Blackf. 357 (Ind. 1842), ctedi n J. O'DONNELL & D. JONES, THE LAW
OF MARRIAGE AND MARRIAGE ALTERNATIVES 97 n.29 (1982).
18. Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390 (1953).
19. Id.
20. "[Nlor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. See, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (illegitimates are not to be denied their
right to support from their natural father); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164
(1972) (illegitimates should share equally with other children who recover workmen's compen-
sation benefits for the death of a parent); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968) (statutes granting causes of action for wrongful death cannot deny a right to recovery to
the parent of an illegitimate child); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (a state may not
create a right of action in children for the wrongful death of a parent which excludes illegiti-
mate children).
22. See generally H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (1971) (discussing child support
laws which were written when illegitimate paternity had only limited legal consequences).
23. The equal protection and due process afforded an illegitimate child have been the
focus of the United States Supreme Court in a number of cases. See cases cited supra note 21.
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per se sufficiently suspect to compel strict judicial scrutiny. 24 Recent United
States Supreme Court cases dealing with illegitimacy, which have applied
varying levels of scrutiny, illustrate the Court's difficulty in arriving at a
consistent method of analysis.
25
Justice Powell, principal architect of the Burger Court's position on ille-
gitimacy under the equal protection clause, 26 stated that "imposing disabili-
ties on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system
that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing."
'27
In Gomez v. Perez 28 the Court found no constitutional justification for
denying support to a child simply because the parents were not married.
This decision illustrates the Court's progression toward broadening the
rights of illegitimate children.
3. Development of Colorado Law
Colorado's UPA29 provides the statutory framework for child support.
The roots of this part of the UPA can be found in a Texas law review article
written by Harry Krause in 1966, which was considered revolutionary at the
time it was written. 30 In effect since July 1977, the Colorado UPA allows the
parent-child relationship to be established or acknowledged, regardless of the
parents' marital status. The act attempts to abolish the stigma attached to
bastardy by avoiding the labels of "illegitimacy" and "legitimacy.
' 3 1
Parental child support for illegitimate children, as provided for by the
Colorado UPA, is not new to Colorado. As early as 1918, in Wamsle; v. Peo-
ple, 32 a father was convicted under Colorado's nonsupport statute of 1911
for failure to support his illegitimate child. Over fifty years later in Munn v.
Munn,33 the court held that the father's support obligation to his illegitimate
child could not differ substantially from that owed to his legitimate child.
Colorado Supreme Court Chief Justice Pringle, in his 1972 dissent in In Re
L.B., wrote: "We have, it seems to me, now passed the time when we distin-
24. The Supreme Court traditionally gave only minimal scrutiny to gender-based classifi-
cations. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute upheld which permitted only the wife
or daughter of a male owner of a liquor establishment to bartend). Goesaert was later overruled
by Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (finding gender-based classification in drinking age law
to be unconstitutional).
25. See, e.g., Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (applying a rational relationship test);
Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (applying intermediate-level scrutiny).
26. He wrote not only the majority opinion in Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972), but also three other majority opinions, two concurring opinions and one plural-
ity opinion.
27. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. at 175-76.
28. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
29. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982).
30. Krause, Bringing the Bastard into the Great Socey." A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitmac , 44
TEX. L. REV. 829 (1966).
31. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 22 (1971) (noting the danger
that a legislature, overconcerned with nomenclature, may think it has solved an unpleasant
problem by outlawing an unpleasant word).
32. 64 Colo. 521, 173 P. 425 (1918).
33. 168 Colo. 76, 450 P.2d 68 (1969).
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guish between so-called 'illegitimate' children and 'legitimate' children.
34
B. Parental Rights of Unwed Fathers
1. The United States Supreme Court and Gender-Based
Classifications
Because the father owed no legal duty to his illegitimate child at com-
mon law, it naturally followed that he should have no rights concerning the
child. Responding to the need to reduce welfare rolls, the laws eventually
changed and support duties were imposed upon the father. 35 Unlike most
obligations, this duty came with no rights as courts have often failed to rec-
ognize the unwed father's right to visitation and custody.
36
During the last ten years, the judicial trend has been to broaden the
parental rights of unwed fathers and more closely scrutinize some of the disa-
bilities under which unwed fathers traditionally have been placed with re-
spect to their children. 37 Some of this expansion of rights has been based on
procedural due process requirements, as illustrated in Stanley v. Illhnois. 38 In
Stanley, the Court held that the Illinois statute in question created an uncon-
stitutional irrebuttable presumption that all unmarried fathers are unsuita-
ble parents.39 The Court recognized the due process right of a biological
father to maintain a parental relationship with his children, unless he is
found to be unfit.
40
Many of the United States Supreme Court decisions broadening the
rights of unwed fathers, like those broadening the rights of illegitimate chil-
dren, have been based on the fourteenth amendment a.4  These cases are best
understood by reviewing the Court's complicated equal protection approach
to gender-based classifications. 42 Until 1971, the United States Supreme
Court employed a two-tier test to judge the validity of a statute under consti-
tutional attack based on the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Under the minimal scrutiny required by the traditional "lower
tier," most statutes were upheld since they were only required to show a
"rational relationship" to a legitimate state end.4 3 The "upper tier test,"
requiring a "compelling state interest," was applied to statutes restricting
fundamental rights and creating suspect classes such as race.
44
34. 179 Colo. 11, 19, 498 P.2d 1157, 1161-62 (1972).
35. See H. KRAUSE, supra note 22.
36. Seegenerally W. WADLINGTON & M. PAULSEN, DOMESTIc RELATIONS § 8 (3d ed. 1978)
(discussing the lack of attendant rights of unwed fathers).
37. Comment, Equal Protection and the Putative Father: An Analysis of Parham v. Hughes and
Caban v. Mohammed, 34 Sw. L.J. 717 (1980).
38. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
39. Id. at 656-57.
40. Id. at 649.
41. See supra note 21.
42. Discrimination against the unwed father involves three separate judicial classifications:
gender, marital status, and illegitimacy. See Note, R. McG. & C.W. v. J.W. & W.W.." The
Putative Father's Right to Standing to Rebut the Marital Presumption of Paternity, 76 Nw. U.L. REV.
669, 674 (1981).
43. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). For a more recent decision
based on the rational basis test, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
44. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Harper v. Virginia Bd.
1983]
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The Court's dislike for the two-tier test surfaced in 1971 when it devel-
oped an intermediate level of scrutiny in Reedv. Reed.4 5 Writing for a unani-
mous Court, Chief Justice Burger applied a "heightened scrutiny" test to
invalidate a statute which favored men over women as administrators of de-
cedents' estates. The new test required that a classification have "a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."'46 In Frontiero v. Richard-
son,4 7 decided two years later, four justices supported the elevation of gender
to the level of a suspect class, but the idea did not receive majority support.
In Craig v. Boren48 the Court clarified its equal protection test for gender
discrimination cases by taking an activist stand and invalidating a statute
that discriminated against males. The Court stated that: "classifications by
gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be substan-
tially related to achievement of those objectives."
'49
In Caban v. Mohammed 5° the Court applied its intermediate scrutiny test
to the rights of unwed fathers and invalidated a New York statute allowing
unmarried mothers, but not unmarried fathers, to prevent the adoption of
their children by withholding consent. The Court held that the statute was
violative of equal protection because it created a gender-based distinction
between unwed parents bearing no substantial relationship to the state's as-
serted interests. 51 The Court refused to accept the state's argument that ma-
ternal and paternal relations are fundamentally different.
The Court's five-four split in Caban vividly illustrates the difficulty of
defining unwed fathers' rights in the equal protection context. This lack of
agreement indicates a judicial reluctance to further broaden rights in this
area. Consequently, it would appear that Caban represents the current cul-
mination in the development of the unwed father's rights.
2. Colorado Supreme Court
In 1981 the Colorado Supreme Court in R. McG v. J W 52 seriously
weakened a longstanding legal presumption that the husband of the mother
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(right to privacy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1962) (race).
45. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
46. d. at 76.
47. 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 n.17 (1973). The plurality enunciated three criteria which char-
acterize a suspect class: 1) the class suffers from an immutable characteristic determined solely
by accident of birth and bearing no relation to the ability to contribute in society; 2) the class
suffers historic vilification; and 3) the class lacks effective political power and redress.
48. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (invalidating a statute prohibiting beer sales to males under 21
and females under 18).
49. Id. at 197. The Court in Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) showed its hesitancy
to implement the intermediate scrutiny test laid out in Craig. In Parham the plurality actively
avoided characterizing the statute as gender-based. Instead, they justified their decision on
comparatively trivial differences in circumstance.
50. 441 U.S. 380 (1979). Caban was the first unwed father case to directly face the equal
protection issues.
51. Id. at 393-94.
52. 615 P.2d 666 (Colo. 1980). For an indepth analysis of this case, see Bastardizing the
Legitimate Child- The Colorado Supreme Court Invalidates the Uniform Parentage Act Presumption of Legit-
miac, in R. McG. v. J.W., 59 DEN. L.J. 157 (1981).
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of a child born during marriage is the father of that child. 53 The court held
that R. McG., the alleged biological father, must be given standing to rebut
such a presumption and an opportunity to establish the existence of a par-
ent-child relationship with C.W., his alleged minor child, 54 even though the
child's mother was married to another at the time of conception and had
remained married at the time of trial.
The Colorado court relied on Supreme Court precedents, including
Stanley and Caban, in finding this gender-based distinction unconstitu-
tional. 55 The court held that the UPA statute56 violated equal protection by
granting biological mothers judicial access while denying putative biological
fathers standing. Such a distinction, the court said, was not substantially
related to an important governmental interest.
57
Although the intermediate level of scrutiny does not require a statute to
fit the state's interest exactly, the court noted that the statute must, at least,
substantially mesh with the classification's purpose;58 such was not the case
in R. MG. 59 The court further held that the denial of standing to R. McG.
violated the equal rights amendment of the Colorado Constitution, which
forbids the denial of equal rights on the basis of sex.6"
The justices in R. McG. also found fatal flaws under procedural due
process analysis. They stated that although the drafters of the UPA claimed
that the act created presumptions rebuttable by clear and convincing evi-
dence,6 1 the UPA was actually irrebuttable because it denied an unwed fa-
ther standing to rebut. 62  The court eyed the presumption with
apprehension in light of the recent judicial trend away from irrebuttable
presumptions, noting the similarity between the statutory framework of the
UPA and the presumption held violative in Stanley.6 3 Several commentators
believe this controversial decision will have far-reaching effects especially in
this time of rapidly changing reproductive techniques.
64
53. Historically, this presumption,pater est quem nupttae demonstral, could be conquered only
by strong proof of the husband's absence or impotency. In England the rule was that any
children born to a man's wife were irrebuttably presumed to be his issue, if the husband was
anywhere within the "four seas." Note, supra note 42, at 669. See, 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 398-99 (2d ed. 1903), citedrn Note, supra note 42, at
699.
54. Test results showed a 98.89% probability that R. McG. was the child's father. 615 P.2d
at 668.
55. 615 P.2d at 671.
56. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-105 to -107 (1978).
57. 615 P.2d at 670.
58. Id. at 671.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 670. "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
state of Colorado or any of its political subdivisions on account of sex." COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 29.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105(2) (1978).
62. 615 P.2d at 671.
63. The Stantey Court said that procedure by presumption was permissible, but "when.
[that] procedure forecloses the determinative issues . . . [and] explicitly disdains present reali-
ties in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running roughshod over the important
interests of both parents and child." 405 U.S. at 657.




Judicially mandated, In re SP.B. leaves no doubt that the constitutional
principles articulated ten years ago by the United States Supreme Court in a
series of highly controversial decisions6 5 are still arousing debate in Colo-
rado. Through its affirmation of the district court opinion, the Colorado
Supreme Court gave no credence to either the equal protection or due pro-
cess arguments advanced by the unwed father.
The court held that the father, P.D.G., could not escape his obligation
to provide child support. This decision was perhaps made inevitable in light
of the constitutional mandate set forth a decade ago in Gomez,
66 which re-
quired equal support for illegitimate and legitimate children.
Although controversy over the continuing enforcement of child support
duties against unwed fathers6 7 undoubtedly will continue, in this era in
which the courts have, in essence, said that women have a choice not to be
burdened with unwanted children but that men have no choice;6 8 the
court's finding of a paternal support obligation in SP.B. is not surprising.
Moreover, this decision furthers the state's objective of protecting the best
interests of the child.
A. The Father's Position
Although the father admitted paternity, he advanced several arguments
in denial of a child support obligation. He argued that the UPA, through its
statutory imposition of the duty of child support upon both parents without
granting the father the right to decide whether to terminate the pregnancy,
violates the father's right to equal protection of the laws under both the
United States Constitution
6 9 and the state constitution.
70
The father also claimed that the UPA creates an irrebuttable presump-
tion that a father must share in child support. According to the father, this
presumption is no longer valid because the availability of legal abortions
breaks the required nexus between intercourse and birth. He contended that
he should at least be given an opportunity to demonstrate that this nexus
had been broken.
7 1
The father reasoned that the wide-spread availability of legalized abor-
tions, together with the mother's unilateral decision to have the child against
his wishes, served as an "intervening factor" breaking the nexus between the
ger ofa Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REV. 777 (1970) (discussing the current judicial dilemma
concerning artificial insemination).
65. See supra notes 4-5.
66. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
67. See Comment, Child Support: Implications ofAbortion on the Relative Parental Duties, 28 U.
FLA. L. REV. 988 (1976).
68. Swan, Paternal Child-Support Tort Parallels for the Abortion on Maternal Demand Era: The
Work ofRegan, Levy, and Duncan, 3 GLENDALE L. REV. 249, 250 (1978-79).
69. See supra note 20.
70. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law."
COLO. CONsT. art. II, § 25. This clause has been interpreted to include equal protection of
laws. See Vanderhoof v. People, 152 Colo. 147, 380 P.2d 903 (1963).
71. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 1.
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act of intercourse and the birth. 72 Specifically, the father advanced his belief
that the sex-based distinction found in the UPA was unconstitutional under
the Supreme Court's intermediate scrutiny test.
73
In addition, the father argued that Roe, in making alternatives to birth
available, removed the inevitability of an implied contract between the par-
ties in which they agree that the father will meet his support obligation if
conception occurs.74 At most, the father contended, the parties impliedly
contract to share the expense of the immediate consequences of their act-
the expense of the pregnancy or the abortion. The father noted that if a
court were to find that the parties did enter into an implied contract to sup-
port the child, this would result in paternal rights to the fetus, a right the
Supreme Court has emphatically denied.
75
The father also contended that Roe destroys any tort basis for imposing
support liability on the biological father. 76 Under the tort theory, the "neg-
ligence" of the father arises in the performance of an act that potentially
requires parental liability. This liability is not imposed, however, unless the
act is the proximate cause of the injury. The mother's unilateral decision to
bear a child or to abort acts as an intervening force and removes the act of
intercourse as the proximate cause of birth.
77
Additionally, the father proposed that the mother indemnify him for his
child support expenses since she had the last clear chance to avoid birth, and
her inaction was more responsible for the damages (birth) than his action.
The father maintained that every plaintiff in Colorado has a duty to miti-
gate the damages sustained. The mother failed in this duty, and as a result
the father's liability should be limited to the cost of an abortion or childbirth
and should not extend to the aggravated damage of child support.
78
Finally, the father argued that traditional concepts of American law
require that obligations imposed upon an individual be offset by the enjoy-
ment of corresponding rights. According to the father, these rights were
foreclosed and the fair consequence would be placing the burden of financial
responsibility on the mother for her unilateral decision.79 The father likened
his role to that of an artificial insemination donor. Under Colorado law,
these fathers are non-liable, even though they are aware that their donation
will possibly result in child support needs.80
B. The State's Position
The state reasoned that the father's duty to the child is no greater than
the obligation imposed on the mother, and that such a duty is mandated on
72. Id. at 3.
73. See supra note 42.
74. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 4-5.
75. Id. at 5-6. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
76. Brief for Respondent-Appellant, supra note 1, at 6-7.
77. Id at 6.
78. Id at 6-8.
79. Id. at 10.
80. Id at 9. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-106 (1978).
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equal protection grounds by Gomez. 8 1 The state claimed that the best inter-
ests of the child are served by the statutory provisions of the UPA,8 2 which
presume a shared parental support obligation; moreover, it was asserted that
the child's equal protection rights would be violated unless the father's duty
to support was affirmed. The state strengthened this argument by compar-
ing the total innocence of the child with the father's relative lack of
innocence.
83
The state reiterated the United States Supreme Court's position that
the right to privacy requires freedom from governmental intrusion into areas
as intimate as the decision to bear or abort a child.8 4 Noting that it was the
father's conscious decision to engage in sexual intercourse with the possible
consequence of conception, the state asserted that the father's desire to pre-
clude this natural result could not be forced upon the mother or enforced by
the state as this would constitute impermissible governmental intrusion.
8 5
The state also observed that other jurisdictions have ruled against un-
wed fathers making similar arguments.8 6 With facts precisely on point to
SPB, the Alabama Supreme Court in Hars v. State,8 7 rejected the father's
offer to pay for an abortion as a legitimate escape from his child support
obligation. The Alabama justices rejected the father's argument that be-
cause he was denied any decision as to the birth of the child, he should be
released from any child maintenance obligation. Furthermore, the court
held that the state's paternity statutes did not deny the father equal protec-
tion of the laws.8'
The Maryland Court of Appeals in Dorsey v. Enghsh 89 found no merit to
a father's theory that the nexus between intercourse and birth is broken by
the woman's right to abortion. The court discounted the father's claim that
his role in the birth of the child had become so attenuated that his circum-
stance was dissimilar from the mother, and that the Maryland statute
treated him unequally.9°
C. The Colorado Supreme Court's Holding
The court's holding was significantly influenced by Colorado's interest
in promoting the welfare of its children. 0' The court validated the statutory
presumption requiring parents who have participated in an act resulting in
conception to be jointly responsible for their actions and this presumption
81. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee at 6, In re S.P.B. 651 P.2d 1213 (Colo. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Petitioner-Appellee]; Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. at 538.
82. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-102 (1978).
83. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 81, at 7.
84. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
85. Brief for Petitioner-Appellee, supra note 81, at 8-9.
86. Id. at 9.
87. 356 So. 2d 623 (Ala. 1978).
88. Id at 624.
89. 283 Md. 522, 390 A.2d 1133 (1978).
90. A case with similar facts in the Texas Civil Appeals Court arrived at the same conclu-
sion. D.W.L. v. M.J.B.C., 601 S.W.2d 475 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
91. 651 P.2d at 1217.
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was found to reflect the "well-considered judgment" of the legislature.
9 2
The court emphasized, however, that the state has little room for error on its
constitutional catwalk toward protecting the best interests of the child, due
to the proscription from interference with the woman's "fundamental right"
to make decisions regarding her pregnancy.
9 3
Although the justices recognized the existence of a sex-based classifica-
tion they, nonetheless, upheld the statute by finding that the father's right to
be free from these classifications is outweighed by the state's substantial,
competing interest. Additionally, the court, applying heightened judicial
scrutiny, found that an important governmental objective is served by the
classification and that it is substantially related to the achievement of that
objective.
94
Recognizing the disfavor with which irrebuttable presumptions have
been viewed in light of the due process clause,95 the court applied the Vlandis
v. Kline two-pronged test.96 The SP.B. court found the father incapable of
meeting the second prong of the test, which requires a challenger to demon-
strate that the state has reasonable alternative means of making its determi-
nation without applying an irrebuttable presumption. Therefore, the court
never reached the first prong of the test,97 which provides that a statutory
presumption can be invalidated only when it is not necessarily or universally
true.
The father's request for a case-by-case determination 98 of the existence
of the nexus was swiftly rejected on the basis of three critical interests served
by the presumption. The court found that the presumption of a shared pa-
rental support obligation protects the interests of the child, the interests of




Almost one-third of the births in this country are the result of non-legal-
ized relationships.'° The rights of these children have evolved over centu-
ries to a current judicial policy,10 1 which requires that such children receive
care, maintenance, and education equivalent to children born of a legalized
92. Id
93. Id at 1216. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (decision whether to bear
a child is fundamental); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
94. 651 P.2d at 1215.
95. The Supreme Court emasculated irrebuttable presumptions in a series of decisions
stretching from the early 1940's to the late 1960's. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
631 (1969) (presumption that new residents exploited welfare system condemned); Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (presumption denying voting by military struck down); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (injustice of automatic sterilization). See also L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092-93 (1978).
96. 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
97. 651 P.2d at 1217.
98. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 452 (1973).
99. 651 P.2d at 1217.
100. FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 95 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds. 1979).




In an effort to prevent the state from suffering economically for the so-
called "sins of the fathers," several states have enacted parental support stat-
utes.' 0 3 Although such statutes are fair in some respects, they are contrary to
basic American judicial traditions in their imposition of obligations without
the granting of concurring rights.'0 4 This analysis will discuss the unwed
father's support obligation, the underlying social policies, and the court's
procedure in implementing this obligation.
A. The Question of the Nexus
Although paternal support statutes have been in effect for many years,
few scholars questioned their constitutionality until Roe. Under Roe, the de-
cision whether to abort rests solely with the mother and her physician,
10 5
allowing the mother to make a unilateral decision completely unaffected by
the desires or direction of the father. The mother's unilateral decision-mak-
ing capability raises questions concerning the proximate cause of birth. Is
conception still the cause, as was the accepted view when abortions were
illegal and unavailable, or does the woman's decision regarding the preg-
nancy intervene as the cause of birth and place responsibility for the support
of the child solely upon her?
If the mother's decision is considered the proximate cause of birth, then
the father's rights under the equal protection clause are violated when he is
forced to support the child, because the mother's action breaks the required
nexus between intercourse and birth. One scholar, examining this nexus,
strongly argued that it is broken under the rationale in Roe and that all
paternal support statutes are invalid, because their underlying premise has
been removed.' 0 6 This argument is supported by reference to such cases as
Doe v. Doe 107 and Jones v. Smith. 108
Indeed, it seems illogical that the same act that cannot commit the fe-
male partner to motherhood can commit the male partner to fatherhood and
twenty-one years of child support. Because the Supreme Court has declared
that a woman's right to privacy guarantees that she should not be burdened
with unwanted children, 1° 9 proponents of the broken nexus theory believe it
102. See generall, H. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA (1981).
103. Nine states including Colorado have adopted legislation conforming to the Uniform
Parentage Act. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 7000-7021 (West Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 19-6-
101 to -129 (1978 & Supp. 1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 584-1 to -26 (1976 Supp. 1982); MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 257.51 to -. 74 (West Supp. 1982); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 40-6-101 to -135 (1981);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 126.011- to -.391 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-01 to -26 (1981);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.010 to .905 (Supp. 1980); WYO. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to -120
(1977).
104. The unwed natural father is only now gaining rights with respect to his child. See supra
text accompanying notes 37-41.
105. 410 U.S. at 163.
106. See supra note 7.
107. 365 Mass. 556, 314 N.E.2d 128 (1974) (a husband has no constitutional or statutory
right to determine whether or not his child should be aborted).
108. 278 So. 2d 339 (Fla. App. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (a potential putative
father does not have the right to restrain the natural mother from terminating her pregnancy).
109. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
[Vol. 60:4
PARENTAL RIGHTS
is inequitable for the father to be so burdened."10
Directly countering this argument is the view currently expressed by the
majority of commentators, who suggest that the nexus is not broken under
the Roe rationale.' I" Under this theory, the mother's decision to bear the
child, even in light of the abortion option, is insufficient to shift the burden
of support solely to her. The foundation for this theory is based on the argu-
ment that the father, as a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence, can
foresee conception and the subsequent birth of the child as a possible conse-
quence of intercourse. Two commentators, Levy and Duncan, 1 2 disagree
that the proximate cause of birth should be imputed to the mother alone,
because such a theory is based on the untenable implication that the
mother's unilateral decision not to abort could have caused the birth inde-
pendently of the original act of intercourse.
Moreover, if the mother has a duty to avoid the natural consequences of
intercourse, an implied contract to abort would result. This type of contract,
as well as any other contract for sexual relations, is in violation of public
policy, 113 and damages for its breach will not be imposed. 114 Consequently,
the father's act of intercourse places him in the position of one jointly respon-
sible for the pregnancy. A chain of causation is created between his actions
and the birth; the mother's unilateral action or inaction serves as a weak
link, though insufficiently weak to break the causal chain.
With the causal connection even feebly intact, any challenge to the va-
lidity of paternal support statutes using the broken nexus approach will fail.
Several theories remain, however, to challenge the support obligation im-
posed on the unwed father.
B. An Oblgation Wihout Rights?
One theory, an equal protection argument distinct from the broken
nexus rationale, was advanced in SPB. and dismissed by the Colorado
court. The father argued that his right to equal protection was violated by
the statutory imposition of a child support obligation on both parents,
1 5
without giving him a role in the decision of whether to terminate the preg-
nancy.11 6 Under the so called "abortion cases,''117 however, equal protec-
tion arguments are subservient to the fundamental privacy rights recognized
as an implicit liberty guarantee in the fourteenth amendment.i8 The court
110. See, e.g., supra note 7.
111. Levy & Duncan, The Impact of Roe v. Wade on Paternal Support Statutes. A Constitutional
Analysis, 10 FAM. L.Q. 179, 193 (1976).
112. Id.
113. Early Colorado law suggests that a contract for sexual relations is void. See Baker v.
Couch, 74 Colo. 380, 221 P. 1089 (1923).
114. Cf J. SONENBLICK, LEGALITY OF LOVE 154 (1981) (no damages will be imposed for
breach of an agreement not to bear children).
115. 651 P.2d at 1215.
116. Id. at 1214.
117. See supra notes 4 and 5.
118. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating a law which
prohibited distribution of nonprescription contraceptives to adults except by licensed pharma-
cists and to persons under sixteen who do not have the approval of a licensed physician); Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (decision to bear children is a privacy right belonging to a
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in SP.B., therefore, properly dismissed this argument.
The statutory imposition of the duty of child support upon both parents
will inevitably pass the intermediate standard of review employed by the
Supreme Court in cases of gender classifications. " 9 The classification pres-
ent in the parental support statutes serves the important governmental
objectives of ensuring the woman's right to privacy and the best interest of
the child, and is substantially related to achievement of those objectives.
The statute also passes the standard of review mandated at the state
level, since the Colorado Equal Rights Amendment 120 exempts from scru-
tiny a narrow class of cases in which the classification of the sexes is based on
physiological differences. 12 1 Undoubtedly, this exemption includes the ca-
pability of women to carry and bear children. 122 Even the most skeptical
critics of the imposition of child support obligations on the unwed father
have been forced to agree that the sexes are not similarly situated with re-
spect to childbirth. Consequently, the inevitable conclusion surfaces: abso-
lute equal treatment is not mandated by the constitution. The only
requirement is that the classification meet the intermediate scrutiny
standard.
C. The Irrebuttable Presumption
The court, zealous in pursuing its goal to protect the best interests of the
child, also found the father's procedural due process argument to be without
merit.' 2 3 The SP. court held that the father's suggestion of a case-by-case
determination of the existence of a child support obligation, rather than util-
ization of the irrebuttable presumption, failed to meet the second prong of
the Vlandis test,1 2 4 because such an ad hoc determination is an unreasonable
alternative for the state.'
2 5
The court reasoned that a case-by-case determination would constitute
"unconscionable governmental interference with privacy rights which the
Supreme Court has deemed inviolate."' 2 6 This privacy argument is inade-
quate for several reasons.
single person as well as a married person); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invali-
dating a law which made it a crime to use contraceptives).
119. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
120. CoLO. CONST. art. II, § 29.
121. G. DouTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAw 302 (1979).
122. People v. Green, 183 Colo. 25, 514 P.2d 769 (1973). As a consequence of such exemp-
tion, a Colorado rape statute, COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-3-401 (1963), punishing only male offend-
ers was found constitutional in People v. Sahnas, 191 Colo. 171, 551 P.2d 703 (1976). The Sahnas
court stated that the Equal Rights Amendment "does not prohibit differential treatment among
the sexes when, as here, that treatment is reasonably and genuinely based on physical character-
istics unique to just one sex .... In such a case, the sexes are not similarly situated and thus,
equal treatment is not required." Id at 174, 551 P.2d at 706. Note, however, that COLO. REV.
STAT. § 18-3-401 (1973) now punishes both male and female offenders.
123. 651 P.2d at 1214.
124. Under Vlandis an irrebuttable statutory presumption can be invalidated only when a
two-pronged test is met: when the presumption is not necessarily or universally true, and when
the state has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination. 412 U.S. at
452.




In most previous cases involving the penumbra-based constitutional
right to privacy, a statute was found invalid when individuals challenged
that statute because they believed it violated their privacy. 1'27 In these cases
the challenged statutes were found invalid because they created unwar-
ranted intrusions into intimate and private spheres. Although the father in
SP.B. was willing to waive his right to privacy, the court would not allow
the mother's right to privacy, inseparable from the father's under these cir-
cumstances, to be violated. The result is an interesting and questionable
twist in judicial interpretation of who can assert a privacy interest and when
it can be asserted.
The court cloaked itself with a privacy rationale and did not articulate
the true reasons behind the denial of the case-by-case method: public policy
considerations and administrative convenience. 12 8 Apparently uncomforta-
ble with basing their decision explicitly upon these reasons, the court re-
sorted to a "parade of horribles" argument which climaxed when the court
said it should not be burdened with a judicial inquiry into "any of a multi-
tude of legal theories which ingenious litigants and their lawyers might ad-
vance."' 1 9 The court stated that such an inquiry would represent an
unconscionable governmental interference with privacy rights. 130 Although
it may legitimately be argued that such a procedure would be a difficult
task, case-by-case determination is a traditional role of the courts and ad-
ministrative convenience alone is not a valid reason to uphold an irrebut-
table presumption. 131
The irony behind the court's use of privacy to prevent rebuttal of the
presumption becomes clear when one realizes that one year earlier, in R.
McG v.J W,132 the Colorado Supreme Court explicitly rejected a very pow-
erful privacy argument advanced by a woman and her husband. Indeed, R.
McG. paves the way for a serious intrusion into the private, intimate sphere
of marriage.
The court in R. McG. allowed an alleged biological father to rebut a
long standing legal presumption. 133 The unwed father in SPB., however,
was not allowed to rebut the presumption of the father's duty to share in
child support. Such a difference is difficult to reconcile. Undoubtedly, the
court noted that R. McG. dealt with the denial of the parent-child relation-
ship, while in SP.B. only a monetary property interest was at issue.
134
Putting all other theories aside, the unwed father should prevail in his
127. Se, supra note 118.
128. Dorsey v. English, 283 Md. 522, 526, 390 A.2d 1133, 1138 (1978). The court in Dorsey
listed the simplification of procedures as one reason for upholding a similar statute.
129. 651 P.2d at 1217.
130. Id
131. The Stanley Court said that although "efficacious procedures to achieve legitimate state
ends [are] a proper state interest . . .the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. . . . Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized
determination." 405 U.S. at 656-57.
132. 615 P.2d 666. The mother and her husband argued that their constitutional right to
privacy was violated by the court's grant of standing to the putative father, R. McG. 1d at 672.
133. See supra note 53.
134. See Swan, supra note 7, at 257.
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effort to submit evidence to rebut the presumption simply because such a
presumption is contrary to due process, which requires an opportunity to be
heard in protection of a property interest. 135 In order to determine whether
or not the unwed father should be provided an opportunity to rebut the
presumption of the shared parental obligation of child support, due process
demands that the competing private and state interests be weighed. 136 In
SP.B. the unwed father's property interest, the cost of twenty-one years of
child support plus half the expense of birth, should be weighed against the
state's legitimate interests, which are the best interests of the child and the
state's economic interest in preventing the child from becoming its ward.'
37
As noted by Justice Marshall: "Where the private interests affected are
very important, and the governmental interest can be promoted without
much difficulty by a well-designed hearing procedure," the Constitution "re-
quires the government to act on an individualized basis, with general pro-
positions serving only as rebuttable presumptions or other burden-shifting
devices."' 138 Because the father has a constitutionally cognizable property
interest, such a weighing process leads to the logical conclusion that he be
given an opportunity to be heard.
Although it may be argued that unwed fathers will seldom be successful
in rebutting the presumption of their child support duties and that Colorado
need not undergo the administrative inconvenience of such inquiry, the due
process clause was designed to protect such fragile individual rights from the
often overbearing governmental concern for efficiency. 139 In light of these
due process considerations, unwed fathers should be allowed to submit evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of responsibility for child support.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Colorado Supreme Court's decision in S.P.B. reaffirms the slow and
sometimes painful evolution of the legal status of illegitimate children from
second-class citizens to equal participants in society. The decision recognizes
the unwed mother's constitutional right to privacy, and right to unilaterally
choose to abort or bear a child while not foregoing the possibility of child
support from the father. The court in SP.B. affirms the interest of the state
minimizing its welfare roles while ensuring adequate support of its children.
The decision, however, fails to recognize the unwed father's constitutional
right to procedural due process by upholding an irrebuttable presumption of
mutual, parental child support obligations.
135. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951) (due process con-
sists of those procedural safeguards designed to accord to the individual the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind).
136. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 (1972).
137. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (discussing constitutional adequacy
of state's procedures). In S.P.B., the risk of erroneous deprivation of the father's interest was
high while the value of a hearing, as an additional procedural safeguard, was not unduly
burdensome.
138. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring).
139. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. at 656.
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While the court's dismissal of the father's equal protection claim is justi-
fied, dismissal of his due process argument is flawed. Through this denial of
due process, the court strikes a needlessly dangerous balance between com-
peting state and private interests. This problem could have been avoided
effectively by permitting the father to rebut the presumption of his child
support obligation and by requiring the court to reach the merits of his case.
Procedure by presumption is seldom justified, 140 and it is not justified here.
Although case-by-case determination may present complications for the
court, such complications are surmountable.1
4t
SPB. not only represents the end of the trend in Colorado toward
broadening the rights of an unwed father, it represents a judicial step back-
ward in the area of an unwed father's rights to procedural due process.
Kathyn L. Sjuzn
140. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1092 (1978).
141. The Supreme Court has found that interests similar to the one at stake in S.P.B. were
important enough to trigger the admission of rebuttal evidence. Cleveland School Bd. v. La-
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (fitness of pregnant teachers); United States Dep't of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (food stamps); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973) (reduced
college tuition); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (unwed father's competency to raise his
children); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (suspension of a driver's license).
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